Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

3-1-2011

Labor Complementarities and Health in the Agricultural
Household
Achyuta Adhvaryu
Anant Nyshadham

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Adhvaryu, Achyuta and Nyshadham, Anant, "Labor Complementarities and Health in the Agricultural
Household" (2011). Discussion Papers. 1004.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/1004

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
P.O. Box 208629
New Haven, CT 06520-8269
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 996

Labor Complementarities and Health in the
Agricultural Household

Achyuta Adhvaryu
Yale University

Anant Nyshadham
Yale University

March 2011

Notes: Center discussion papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate
discussion and critical comments.
We thank David Atkin, Prashant Bharadwaj, Michael Boozer, Rahul Deb, Jason
Fletcher, James Fenske, Josh Graff Zivin, Fabian Lange, T. Paul Schultz, Tavneet
Suri, Chris Udry, and participants at the Yale ISPS Applied Economics Seminar, the
Yale Labor/Public Finance Lunch, the Yale Health Policy and Administration
Seminar, and the Yale Applied Micro Seminar for helpful comments. Adhvaryu:
Yale University, e-mail: achyuta.adhvaryu@yale.edu , web:
http://www.yale.edu/adhvaryu. Nyshadham: Yale University, e-mail:
anant.nyshadham@yale.edu.

Labor Complementarities and Health in the Agricultural Household
Achyuta Adhvaryu* and Anant Nyshadham**

Abstract
Models of the agricultural household have traditionally relied on assumptions regarding
the complementarity or substitutability of family labor inputs. We show how data on time
allocations, health shocks and corresponding treatment choices can be used to test these
assumptions. Data from Tanzania provide evidence that complementarities exist and can
explain the pattern of labor supply adjustments across household members and
productive activities following acute sickness. In particular, we find that sick and healthy
household members both shift labor away from self-employment and into farming when
the sick recover more quickly. Infra-marginal adjustments within farming activity types
provide further evidence of farm-specific complementarities.
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Introduction

The agricultural household model forms the foundation of our understanding of household
decision-making in agricultural societies, particularly in the developing world.
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One common

feature of models of this type is that household production may involve labor inputs from varied
sources. For example, in the presence of labor markets, the farm production function may take
hired as well as family labor as inputs; when labor markets are imperfect or altogether absent,
the distinction may be made between male and female labor or adult and child labor within the
family.
The way in which multiple labor inputs interact in the farm and off-farm production functions can be an important determinant of the predictions made by these model for the behavior
of household members. The complementarity or substitutability of family labor in production
affects the household’s optimal allocation of resources (notably time allocations) as well as the
way household members adjust to shocks. Complementarities may arise, for example, if adults
can monitor children on the farm when they work together, or if males and females specialize
in different aspects of the production process. The extent of substitutability of labor across subgroups of family members may depend on their physical endowments; their traditional roles in
household production; or their farm- or home-specific human capital.
Despite this central role, however, there is little theoretical or empirical consensus on the
nature of this interaction. For example, it has often been assumed that male and female labor
inputs within the family are (imperfect) substitutes (Mark Rosenzweig 1980; Hanan Jacoby 1993;
Michael Baker and Dwayne Benjamin 1997). As regards adult and child labor, some studies
have assumed complementarity (e.g. Rosenzweig and Kenneth Wolpin 1985), while others have
assumed separability of the two inputs (e.g. Jean-Marie Baland and James Robinson 2000). Still
others have restricted the properties of the family production function in a way which implies
either substitutability or complementarity (e.g. Pierre-Andre Chiappori 1997).2
The purpose of our study is to derive a test of the complementarity or substitutability of
family labor in household production. To our knowledge, the only other study which has attempted to do this is by Thomas Kniesner (1976), whose test is important as a first attempt but
is methodologically flawed.3 The present study is different in several ways. First, it studies
1

See Inderjit Singh, Lyn Squire and John Strauss (1986) for a survey of the classic models, and J. Edward Taylor
and Irma Adelman (2003) for a synthesis of the more recent literature.
2
A large literature has examined the related issue of the substitutability of family and hired labor (a classic example is Benjamin (1992)). We do not address this literature here because the distinction between hired and family
labor is only relevant to contexts in which labor markets are complete, whereas in our data labor markets are largely
nonexistent.
3
Knieser’s (1976) test is based on comparing estimates of the effect of the wife’s wage on the husband’s market labor time for two sub-samples of the National Longitudinal Survey: husband-wife pairs in which the wife works, and
pairs in which the wife does not work. He instruments for the wife’s wage using a vector of the wife’s demographic
characteristics. The study’s methods are flawed in at least two aspects. First, in order to derive the cross-price elastic-
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agricultural households in a developing country context, for whom the question of complementarity or substitutability of labor has not, to our knowledge, been tested. Second, we need not
rely on any assumptions on the cross-price elasticities of labor across family members. Third,
since the effective nonexistence of labor markets in our setting renders moot the issue of shifting household member-specific wages, we rely instead on shifting the closest analogs, i.e., the
marginal productivities of farm and non-farm labor.
In particular, we focus on introducing health (and acute shocks to health) into a model of
intra-household allocations. In our model, two household members provide labor inputs in
two sectors of production - farm and off-farm work. Health enters directly into each individual’s utility, and also affects the marginal productivity of labor in both sectors. Under minimal
assumptions on the household decision-making process, we are able to derive a test of the complementarity or substitutability of family labor in the farm and non-farm production functions.
The test exploits the empirically observed patterns of labor adjustment within the household in
response to health shocks.
We estimate the pattern of labor adjustment using an instrument for the healthcare choices
of sick individuals in the household. We propose that the choice of higher quality healthcare
in response to acute illness results in a faster recovery, generating shifts in individuals’ health.
Accordingly, we first verify that using formal-sector care does indeed improve health outcomes
for acutely sick individuals (akin to the results in Achyuta Adhvaryu and Anant Nyshadham
(2010a, 2010b)).
We then estimate the labor supply responses of sick and non-sick household members. Our
estimates reject the substitutability of family labor in farm and non-farm production, and instead
imply that complementarities must exist in at least one sector of production. In particular, we find
that sick and non-sick household members both shift labor away from non-farm and towards
farm labor when the sick recover more quickly. The bulk of the adjustment takes place in labor
on the household’s own farm and in self-employment. Infra-marginal adjustments across types
of farming activities provide further evidence of farm-specific complementarities: we find that
when sick individuals recover, both sick and non-sick household members shift away from crop
maintenance (weeding, pruning, etc.) and into land preparation and harvesting activities. In the
appendix, we examine heterogeneous effects across gender and ages (children versus adults) in
the household.
Understanding the way that labor inputs interact in household production may inform a diverse set of economic questions, from household adjustments following productivity or production technology shocks (Anjini Kochar 1995, 1999; Kathleen Beegle, Rajeev Dehejia and Roberta
ity of male market time with respect to the female wage, the test relies critically on assuming the sign of the opposite
cross-price elasticity (female market time with respect to the male wage). Second, the validity of the exclusion restrictions for the instruments for wife’s wages is tenuous: the wife’s schooling, race and number of children are all
likely related to the husband’s labor supply through channels outside of the wife’s wage.
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Gatti 2006); to schooling-child labor decisions (Mette Ejrnæs and Claus Pörtner 2004; Eric Edmonds 2006); to the relationship between family labor supply and fertility (especially concerning pregnancy and childcare) (T. Paul Schultz 1990); to labor market effects of household health
shocks (Dercon and Krishnan 2000; Adam Wagstaff 2007); to optimal sorting in the marriage
market (Jere Behrman et al. 1994).
Our study also contributes to a large body of literature examining the role of health in intrahousehold resource allocations. Our results, building on work by Mark Pitt et. al (1990), Schultz
(1990) and others, suggest that the health of household members–in addition to affecting bargaining power (Schultz 2001), consumption demand (Pitt and Rosenzweig 1985; Pitt et al. 2006)
and household income (Schultz and Aysit Tansel 1997)–can have large effects on the time allocation decisions of sick as well as healthy household members through production complementarities.
Finally, the findings of this study may be relevant in setting labor-market and health-related
policies, as well. First, we estimate the intra-household spillover effects of treatment for acute
illness; recent studies have focused in general on the spillovers of treatment for longer-term
health conditions (e.g. Giovanna d’Adda et al. 2009; Joshua Graff Zivin et al. 2009). Our results
suggest that making transport to health facilities cheaper, or investing in health infrastructure
in remote areas, improves not only health outcomes, but also has effects on the time allocations
of the sick individual as well as the other members of his household. Second, our results on production complementarities are not contingent on this health-related context; thus, the insights
gained here regarding intra-household adjustments may be applied to any policy which affects
the labor supply or underlying productivity of particular household members.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives
our main test of labor complementarities. Section 3 describes our data set and construction of
important variables. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy and discusses its validity. Section
5 presents the main results of our test. Section 6 discusses the validity of alternative explanations
to the results. Finally, section 7 concludes.

2

Model

We study a collective household model in which two household members divide their time
between leisure and two types of productive activity: farm and non-farm labor. We use the
model to characterize household behavior in the face of health shocks, focusing in particular
on labor allocations within the household. We show that the pattern of adjustment of labor
allocations across sectors and household members depends crucially on the complementarity
or substitutability of household labor in the farm and non-farm production functions. Finally,
we show how data on labor allocations, health shocks and corresponding treatment choices can
4

be used to formulate an empirical test for the presence of labor complementarities in production.

2.1

Setup

Consider a household with two members i ∈ {1, 2}. Let Ω be the individual time endowment;
each household member’s time is allocated toward leisure Li ; labor on one’s own farm (lif );
outside agricultural wage labor (liw ) at wage rate w; and non-farm labor (ti ). The time constraint
for each i is therefore Ω = Li + lif + liw + ti . Individuals value their own consumption of the
two market goods (ci = (cfi , cni )), own leisure (Li ), own health hi , and the health and leisure of
the other family member, h−i and L−i respectively. Each member’s preferences are represented
by a utility function ui (ci , Li , L−i , hi , h−i ).4 Goods are produced via the production functions
for farm and non-farm labor, f (l1f , l2f , lh , h1 , h2 ) and n(t1 , t2 , h1 , h2 ), respectively, where lh is the
total hired labor on the household’s farm. The market prices of the two goods are p = (pf , pn ).
We assume that wage labor exists in the farm sector, but that non-farm labor time is nonmarketable. Suppose further that the amount of outside agricultural wage labor (liw ) is constrained such that for each i the quantity of such labor cannot exceed Mi . These assumptions
are in keeping with our empirical context, as well as other agricultural settings in the developing world (Udry 1996; Fafchamps 1993). In our sample, though the average number of hours
spent farming per week by a member of a household with at least one sick and one non-sick
member is roughly 14.5, less than .5 of these hours is spent working on someone else’s farm for
a wage. This evidence confirms that, while a market for farm labor exists, participation in this
market is constrained to low levels.
Health enters the household allocation problem in two ways. First, it directly provides utility, as described above. Second, it affects each household member’s productivity. We make only
one restriction on the way in which hi enters f and n: we assume that the health of person i does
not directly affect the marginal productivity of person −i. That is,

∂2f
f
∂l−i
∂hi

= 0 and

∂2n
∂t−i ∂hi

= 0.5

Of course, the marginal productivity of −i in each sector is still free to shift as a result of labor
adjustments to an acute health shock to i.
Our focus in this paper is on acute health shocks and corresponding (acute) investments
in treatment for these shocks. Accordingly, we define the health production function as hi =
h(σi Qi , εi ), where σi ∈ {0, 1} is an acute health shock indicator, Qi is the corresponding intensity
of treatment (which we think of as the quality of healthcare for individual i), and εi is a vector
of other inputs into health, such as endowments, long-term care, chronic illness etc. The price
4

Note that we allow explicitly for non-separability of leisure and health across household members. The results
of the model are also robust to considering a fully non-separable utility function within a unitary representation
of the household’s problem. We choose to focus on the collective model in keeping with the recent literature on
intra-household decision-making in developing countries.
5
One way in which this assumption may be violated is through disease contagion; we address this possibility in
section 6.
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of one unit of Qi is pQ . Note that as we have defined the health production function above, Qi
only improves health in the event of a health shock (i.e. when σi = 1). We restrict Qi in this way
to underscore its role as curative care, rather than long-term health investment, preventative care
or the like. We return to this restriction in our discussion of the empirical strategy in section 4.

2.2

Utility maximization

An efficient allocation of resources within the household is characterized as a solution to the
following problem:6
maxc ,L ,lf ,lw ,lh ,t ,Q : i∈{1,2}
i

i i

i

i

i

subject to

u1 (c1 , L1 , L2 , h1 , h2 ) + Φu2 (c2 , L1 , L2 , h1 , h2 )

p · (c1 + c2 ) + pQ (Q1 + Q2 ) ≤ pf f (l1f , l2f , lh , h1 , h2 ) + w(l1w + l2w − lh ) + pn n(t1 , t2 , h1 , h2 )
Li + lif + liw + ti = Ωi ,
liw ≤ Mi ,

i ∈ {1, 2}

(2)

i ∈ {1, 2}

hi = h(σi Qi , εi ),

(1)

(3)

i ∈ {1, 2}

(4)

We make the following standard assumptions about the shapes of the utilities and production functions:
1. Utility is increasing and concave in own consumption:
i = 1, 2.

∂ui ∂ui
,
∂cfi ∂ch
i

> 0 and

∂ 2 ui

2u
i
2
∂ch
i

,∂

< 0, for

∂n ∂f
∂ti , ∂lf
i

> 0 and

∂cfi

2

2. Consumption goods are normal.
3. The production functions are increasing and concave in their labor inputs:
∂2n
∂t2i

,

∂2f
∂lif

2

< 0 for i = 1, 2; and

∂f
∂lh

> 0 and

∂2f
∂lh 2

< 0.

Under the above assumptions, in the unconstrained case (in which the agricultural wage
labor constraints do not bind), we obtain interior solutions for consumption demand, labor
supply and healthcare quality choice as functions of the model’s parameters.7 However, as
noted above, frictions do exist in the agricultural labor market in our context, and thus the
salient case is the one in which the constraint binds, i.e. when liw = Mi and lh = 0. In this case,
6
Ours is a simple variant of the basic constrained optimization problem of the agricultural household, described,
for example, in Bardhan and Udry (1999). We modify the model to include multiple sectors, multiple household
members and a role for health. For similar characterizations of the collective household as they apply to the developing country context, see, e.g, Chiappori (1992, 1997), Udry (1996), Duflo and Udry (2004).
7
We show in appendix section A.1 that in the unconstrained case, in which the agricultural wage labor constraints
do not bind, we are able to derive the same test of complementarities as in the constrained case.
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the budget constraint becomes:
p · (c1 + c2 ) + pQ (Q1 + Q2 ) ≤ pf f (l1f , l2f , 0, h1 , h2 ) + w(M1 + M2 ) + pn n(t1 , t2 , h1 , h2 )

(5)

We focus on two of the necessary first order conditions–those with respect to l2f and t2 , the
own farm and non-farm labor contributions of the second household member. We do this to
draw attention to the intra-household consequences of health shocks and their corresponding
treatment, as below, we examine the case in which household member 1 experiences a health
shock but household member 2 does not. The first order conditions for these two choice variables are as follows (letting λ and δ denote the Lagrange multipliers for the budget constraint
and the time constraint, respectively):
(l2f )

−λ −p

:

(t2 ) :

f

∂f

!
−δ =0

(6)



n ∂n
−λ −p
−δ =0
∂t2

(7)

∂l2f

Combining, we get
pn

∂f
∂n
= pf f .
∂t2
∂l2

(8)

An analogous condition holds for household member 1. Intuitively, at an optimum, each
household member must equate the ratio of marginal productivities across sectors to the inverse
price ratio.

2.3

Using labor adjustments to shocks to test for complementarities in production

Our first goal is to study the pattern of labor adjustments after a health shock. In the model, variation in individual i’s acute sickness may derive from variation in the health shock σi and/or
the variation in healthcare investment Qi . In empirical settings, σi is very difficult to measure,
and exogenous variation in σi is difficult to observe because health shocks are likely jointly determined with health endowments and health preferences, which are unobserved to the econometrician. Though Qi is by construction an endogenous choice of the household, variations in
the exogenous price of healthcare quality pQ may be used as an exogenous shifter of sickness in
order to explore its effects on the household’s reallocation of resources.
Differentiating equation 8 with respect to pQ , we obtain:
p

n



∂ 2 n ∂t1
∂ 2 n ∂t2
∂ 2 n ∂h1
∂ 2 n ∂h2
+
+
+
∂t2 ∂t1 ∂pQ
∂t22 ∂pQ ∂t2 ∂h1 ∂pQ ∂t2 ∂h2 ∂pQ
7



pf

=

∂ 2 f ∂l2f
∂ 2 f ∂h1
∂ 2 f ∂h2
∂l1f
+
+
+
2
∂l2f ∂l1f ∂pQ ∂l2f ∂pQ ∂l2f ∂h1 ∂pQ ∂l2f ∂h2 ∂pQ
∂2f

!
(9)

The above equation indicates that the way in which household members adjust labor allocations following an acute health shock (or, as expressed above, a shift in the price of curative
care) depends crucially on the shapes of the production functions for farm and non-farm labor.
We use this equation to formulate a test for the complementarity of household labor in these
production functions.
We are interested in particular in the labor responses of households with both sick and nonsick members. Thus, let us examine equation 9 for the case in which σ1 = 1 and σ2 = 0 (that
2

n ∂h2
is, only household member 1 is acutely ill). The fourth terms within parentheses ( ∂t∂2 ∂h
and
2 ∂pQ
∂ 2 f ∂h2
∂h2
) on both sides of the equation equal 0 in this case, since ∂p
Q = 0 when σ2 = 0. Further,
∂l2f ∂h2 ∂pQ
2
2
∂h1
n ∂h1
and ∂f f ∂p
the third terms within parentheses ( ∂t∂2 ∂h
Q ) are also 0, since we have imposed
1 ∂pQ
∂l2 ∂h1
2
2n
that the health of i does not directly affect the marginal productivity of −i (i.e. ∂t∂2 ∂h
= ∂f f =
1
∂l2 ∂h1

0). Equation 9 can thus be written as
pn



∂ 2 n ∂t2
∂ 2 n ∂t1
+
∂t2 ∂t1 ∂pQ
∂t22 ∂pQ



= pf

∂l1f
∂ 2 f ∂l2f
+
2
∂l2f ∂l1f ∂pQ ∂l2f ∂pQ
∂2f

!
(10)

The above equation forms the basis of our joint test of household labor complementarities.
The objects of interest are the cross-partials

∂2n
∂t2 ∂t1

and

∂2f
∂l2 ∂l1 .

Note that

∂2n
∂t22

< 0 and

∂2f
∂l22

< 0

by the assumption of concavity of the production functions. The remaining four derivatives
constitute the extent of labor adjustments to shock across household members and activities
(i.e.,

∂kj
∂pQ

for k ∈ {t, lf } and j ∈ {1, 2}).

Assuming complementarity or substitutability of farm and non-farm labor would yield predictions on the signs of these labor adjustments. Conversely, estimating these adjustment terms
and signing them imposes restrictions on the signs of

∂2n
∂t2 ∂t1

and

∂2f
∂l2 ∂l1 .

Thus, estimating the

labor adjustments to health shocks across sectors allows us to test indirectly for the complementarity of substitutability of household labor. In the results section, we return to equation 10 to
use the estimated values of the adjustment terms to draw conclusions about the signs of the
cross-partials.
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3
3.1

Data
Overview

This study uses survey data from the Kagera region of Tanzania, an area west of Lake Victoria,
and bordering Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Kagera is mostly rural and primarily engaged
in producing bananas and coffee in the north, and rain-fed annual crops (maize, sorghum, and
cotton) in the south. The Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS) was conducted by
the World Bank and Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences (MUCHS). The sample
consists of 816 households from 51 “clusters” (or communities) located in 49 villages covering
all five districts of Kagera, interviewed up to four times, from Fall 1991 to January 1994, at
6 to 7 month intervals. The randomized sampling frame was based on the 1988 Tanzanian
Census.8 KHDS is a socio-economic survey following the model of previous World Bank Living
Standards Measurement Surveys. The survey covers individual-, household-, and cluster-level
data related to the economic livelihoods and health of individuals, and the characteristics of
households and communities. In the following paragraphs, we outline the variables we use in
our analyses.

3.2

Health variables

In the health module of the KHDS, all household members are asked about chronic illnesses and
acute illness episodes; care sought for these episodes; and current illness (at the time of survey).9
As our main sample restriction, we use information on whether households contained at least
one sick member (i.e. a member who reported having been sick in the last 14 days with an acute
illness) and one non-sick member. We collapse our observations to the household-year level,
by constructing within-household-year means for important health and labor supply variables.
Our means are constructed using the number of productive household members, which is defined as the number of household members who answered the time use survey (all individuals
above the age of 7). We restrict the sample in this way so that the labor means do not erroneously
take into account household members for whom the time use survey was not asked.
Table I shows summary statistics for the Kagera sample. The number of household-year
observations with at least one sick and one non-sick household member is 2146; this comprises
75% of the household sample reported having at least one sick and one non-sick member. Within
these households, 42% of sick individuals report still being ill at the time of survey.
8
A two-stage, randomized stratified sampling procedure was employed. In the first stage, Census clusters (or
communities) were stratified based on agro-climactic zone and mortality rates and then were randomly sampled.
In the second stage, households within the clusters were stratified into “high-risk” and “low-risk” groups based on
illness and death of household members in the 12 months before enumeration, and then were randomly sampled.
9
In the case of individuals below the age of 15, the primary caretaker of the child is asked to answer on the child’s
behalf.
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Our main independent variable is the proportion of sick household members who visited
formal-sector healthcare, defined as care at a hospital, health center or dispensary (which includes government, NGO, and private facilities). We normalize this variable by its standard
deviation for ease of interpretation. The mean for this normalized proportion is reported in
table 1. Without normalization, about 25% of sick household members sought formal sector
healthcare for their illness episode.

3.3

Labor variables

The time use module of the KHDS collects detailed information on various types of labor supply
for all individuals seven years of age and older. Individuals are asked how many hours in the
past 7 days they spent in each of a variety of activities. We construct a composite variable for the
total labor hours of household members above 7 years old. We then divide the total hours by
the number of productive household members to obtain a per-capita measure of hours across
1) all household members; 2) sick members; and 3) non-sick members. Finally, we break these
various per-capita measures in activity in different sectors.
In particular, we first split total labor hours into farm hours and non-farm hours. Then, we
further split each category into subcategories. We subdivide the farm hours into employment
hours, field and herd hours, and processing hours. Employment hours include hours spent
working on a neighbor’s farm, fishing, and working as a merchant. Other wage employment
outside of the home is included here as well; however, hired farm work makes up the largest
component of wage labor, hence its inclusion here. Field and herd hours include time spent on
the individual’s own farm, on a community farm and time spent herding livestock. Processing
hours include time spent making farm produce and animal products into marketable goods.
We subdivide non-farm hours into self-employment hours and home hours (which is then
further divided to display number of hours spent caring for an ill individual). Self-employment
includes any non-farm activities the profit from which accrues to the individual (as opposed
to working for someone else’s business); this may include household enterprise, production or
sale of market goods, or owning another type of small business (restaurant, hotel, etc.). Home
hours include time spent in household chores, and time spent collecting water and firewood.
For further details on the definitions of the labor supply variables and the method we used to
aggregate them into totals, please refer to the data appendix.
In table 1, we compare means in these labor variables for sick versus non-sick members in
households with at least 1 sick and 1 non-sick member; and for non-sick members of households
with no sick members (i.e. households in which all members are not acutely ill). Several interesting features of the labor data are revealed. First, within “sick” households, sick and non-sick
members appear to be spending nearly the same amount of time in each sector and sub-sector.
For example, both types of individuals report working a total of about 30 hours last week. Of
10

this time, a little less than half (13.5 hours) is spent on the farm, while the rest is spent in nonfarm labor, which is mostly comprised of home labor. t-tests confirm the statistical equality of
per-capita labor amounts across all sectoral categories.
On the other hand, we see significant differences (as again confirmed by t-tests) between the
amount worked by members in “sick” versus “non-sick” households. In households with no sick
members, total labor is significantly greater, and that difference is reflected in both sectors. In
percentage terms, farm labor is about 18% greater in “non-sick” households, while non-farm
labor is 14% greater.
The differences in these per-capita time use variables across “sick” and “non-sick” households, but not across sick and non-sick individuals within the same household, suggest that sick
and non-sick household members may adjust to illness shocks in the same way. In particular, at
least from the mean differences, it appears as though following illness, both sick and non-sick
individuals draw down farm labor relative to off-farm labor, while total labor hours declines
slightly. Clearly, we must not interpret these differences as causal estimates of sickness on the
intra-household allocation of labor. In subsequent sections, we test more rigorously that this
pattern of labor adjustments holds in a causal sense.

3.4

Other household- and cluster-level variables

We use a variety of household- and community-level demographic and socioeconomic characteristics in our regressions. The most important for the purposes of our analysis is the existence
(or, to be precise, the lack of existence) of a formal healthcare facility in the cluster. As Table I
reports, about 50% of households were located in communities without a formal-sector healthcare facility. As we describe in Section 4, we control for a variety of other variables related
to the existence of other resources in one’s community; these are existence of a daily market,
periodic market, motorable road, public transportation, secondary school, bank, and post office/telephone. We also control for the distance to various types of formal-sector care options if
they are not in the household’s community; in particular, we include the distances to the nearest
dispensary, health facility, and hospital (n.b.: if these options are in the individual’s cluster, this
variable equals 0).10 Table 1 reports the means for these variables.
We control for various household characteristics. In particular, specifications include the
maximum years of completed schooling across all household members (quintiles); mean age of
household members (cubic polynomial); and household demographic composition, including
the number of females, adults (age 15 or older), children (younger than age 15), males, females,
men (adult males), women (adult females), boys (male children), and girls (female children). We
also include household size (cubic polynomial); total assets owned by the household (quintiles
10

We control for a cubic polynomial in the distance to nearest formal-sector care facility (which could be any one
of the three types mentioned above), as well as quintiles of the distance to each option separately.
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of an asset index generated using principal components analysis); and year of survey (fixed
effects). Finally, we include district fixed effects.

3.5

Rainfall data

We obtained monthly rainfall data from the Tanzania Meteorological Agency spanning from
1980 to 2004.11 The data set includes the amount of rainfall (in millimeters) per month and total
days with rainfall per month for 21 weather stations in Kagera region. The data set provides
a matching file which report the closest and second closest weather station to each cluster in
the KHDS sample. Two measures of “closest” have been used: a straight-line distance between
each cluster and each rainfall station, and a distance measure which takes into account the location topology of the area. We use the straight-line measure definition of “closest,” and use the
number of days of rainfall in the month the individual was sick as the primary measure of rainfall in our regressions. Further, we match the rainfall observation to the households with sick
members by taking the rainfall value in the month the household was surveyed, in the cluster
in which the household is located. If the rainfall value for this cluster-by-month observation is
missing, we use the value at the second closest rainfall station to the cluster.
We also control for the number of days of rainfall in the month prior to the illness episodes
reported by household members (discussed further in Section 4); the historical mean and historical standard deviation of the distribution of rainfall in the given month, computed over all
the years of available data for the month in question (quadratic terms of these variables are included as well); fixed effects for the closest rainfall station; deciles for the number of days of
rainfall; deciles for the amount of rainfall (in millimeters) in the month the individual fell sick;
and interactions of days of rainfall with the existence of resources variables defined in the previous sub-section. For further details on the construction of rainfall variables, please see the data
appendix.

4

Empirical strategy

Our goal in this section is to propose and discuss the validity of an instrument for healthcare
choice, and to discuss how we use the variation induced by the instrument to first verify the
effects of healthcare choices on health outcomes and then to explore effects on intra-household
labor allocations. The observed patterns in labor supply responses within the household enable
us to test for labor complementarities among family members using the predictions of the model
of household behavior described in Section 2.
11
The
data
set
is
downloadable
africa.com/research/khds/introduction.htm.

from

the
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EDI-Africa

website:

http://www.edi-

4.1

An instrument for healthcare choice

Let Oij denote an outcome for household i in cluster j, let hij denote the household’s composite
healthcare choice (calculated as the proportion of sick individuals in the household sent to formal sector care), and let Xij denote a vector of household- and community-level characteristics.
Consider the following empirical model:
Oij = βhij + X0ij γ + ij .

(11)

As discussed extensively in Adhvaryu and Nyshadham (2010a), measuring the relationship
between healthcare choice and health outcomes using OLS, as shown above in equation 11,
likely results in a biased estimate of the effect of h on O, due to unobserved determinants of
outcomes in the error term  that are correlated with healthcare choice. In particular, the severity
of the health shock likely influences the care option chosen as well as the outcome. That is,
household members with higher-severity illnesses are more likely to be sent to higher quality
healthcare options; and higher-severity illnesses will generate worse health and labor outcomes.
To address these endogeneity concerns, we use an instrument for healthcare choice which
exploits exogenous variation in the costs of formal-sector healthcare. The instrument builds on
the methodology introduced in Adhvaryu and Nyshadham (2010a) and applied in Adhvaryu
and Nyshadham (2010b) at the individual level to the same data used in this study. A major
point discussed in those papers is the fact that the largest costs of formal-sector care in developing countries are often those associated with the opportunity cost (or the direct costs) of travel
to the care facility. Distance to the nearest facility (or alternatively, the presence of a formal
care facility in one’s community) is thus a large determinant of healthcare choice in developing
countries, through its effects on costs (Gertler et al. 1987, Mwabu et al. 1995, Mwabu 2009).
Following Adhvaryu and Nyshadham (2010a), we propose an interaction instrument: specifically, we interact a dummy variable for the absence of a formal-sector health facility in a household’s community with the number of days of rainfall in the month in which the household
reported having at least one ill member, and exclude only this interaction from the second stage,
while controlling for the main effects of facility “existence” and days of rainfall in the first and
second stages of a two-stage instrumental variables estimator. In doing so, we use as our instrument only the temporary, random amplification caused by rainfall of the opportunity cost
of time represented in the facility existence dummy, thereby avoiding issues of unobserved systematic variation in long-term access to resources that accompany the use of facility existence
alone.
The two stages of analysis are specified as follows. Define N oF acj to be a dummy variable
which equals 1 if no formal-sector health facility exists in cluster j, and Rij to be the number
of days of rainfall in cluster j in the month in which household i reported having at least one
13

sick member (and one non-sick member, to allow for analysis on intrahousehold labor effects of
sickness).12 The two-step estimator is written as follows:
1st stage:
2nd stage:

hij = α1 (N oF acij x Rij ) + α2 N oF acij + α3 Rij + X0ij α4 + ζij
Oij = β1 hij + β2 N oF acij + β3 Rij +

X0ij β4

+ ij

(12)
(13)

The intuition behind the instrument is simple. The main effects of facility non-existence and
rainfall are likely both negative; that is, not having a facility in a household’s community and
being exposed to more rainfall should, for the purposes of travel costs, discourage the household
from sending sick members to formal-sector health facilities. Moreover, heavier rains should
discourage households that are farther away more than households located in a community with
a health facility.
Imagine one household located directly next to a facility, while another is located many
villages away. In times of dry weather, clearly the household in the community with a health
facility will be more likely to choose formal-sector care than the one farther away. However, in
times of heavy rains, the rain should incrementally deter the farther household more than the
one just next door.

4.2

Instrument validity

Ideally, we would like variation in the instrument to be equivalent to experimental variation in
the price of formal-sector care. That is, we would like to answer the question, “Holding all other
prices constant, if we shift only the price of formal-sector care, how does the demand for this
care change, and subsequently, how do these shifts affect health and labor supply outcomes?”
One crucial element of our argument is thus that the interaction instrument must induce price
changes solely in the costs of formal-sector care, as opposed to shifting other prices which determine access to other resources, as well as directly influence consumption and labor allocations.
4.2.1

Controlling for general remoteness

It is plausible that fluctuations in rainfall induce differential price shifts in communities with
health facilities as compared with communities without. For example, suppose non-existence
of a formal care facility was correlated with a community’s general remoteness; that is, communities lacking health facilities lacked access to other important resources (commodity and labor
markets, roads, irrigation, etc.). In controlling for the main effect of the existence of a health
12

We define the facility “existence” variable in the negative in order to make interpretation of the interaction
coefficient easier; of course, changing this variable to reflect the existence of a health facility as opposed to the lack
of existence has no effect on the estimation procedure or the results (barring changing the sign of the coefficients on
the interaction term and the main effect of facility existence).
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facility in the community, and excluding only its interaction with days of rainfall, we control
for the long-term, baseline effects of access to various resources, as mentioned above. However,
since rainfall, through the interaction instrument, acts as a randomized amplifier of the costs of
access to formal-sector care, rainfall could amplify the costs of access to these other resources
as well. If this were true, the instrument would not be excludable. To address this problem,
borrowing the strategy used in Adhvaryu and Nyshadham (2010b), we control for the existence
and distance to a variety of important resources, as well as the interactions of these variables
with days of rainfall.13 Controlling for the main effects of this rich set of variables and its interaction with rainfall ensures that the variation induced by the instrument is specific to the costs
of formal-sector care.
4.2.2

Selection into sickness

One desirable feature of the instrument for healthcare choice must be that it does not predict
selection into sickness, but rather only the choice of care conditional on acute sickness. To check
that this is indeed the case, we regress a dummy for having at least one sick member and one
non-sick member in the household of at least 7 years of age on the interaction instrument, the
main effects, and the full set of controls. The results, reported in column 1 of Table A.1, verify
that the instrument does not predict selection into acute sickness: the coefficient on the interaction instrument is a precisely estimated zero. In columns 2-4 of Table A.1, we report results
from similar regressions which check that the instrument does not predict selection into the
other samples used in our analysis: households with one sick member and one non-sick male,
households with one sick member and one non-sick female, and households with no sick members.
4.2.3

Instrument does not shift labor supply for non-sick households

We posit that the interaction instrument shifts the costs of access to formal-sector care, and
thus generates exogenous shifts in the healthcare choices–and ultimately the health and labor
outcomes–of sick individuals. If this is the dominant mechanism through which our instrument
works, we should not observe that this variable shifts labor allocations for households with no
sick members. To test this hypothesis, we regress per-capita labor outcomes (hours of non-sick
members aggregated to the household level, divided by number of non-sick household members) on the instrument and the full set of controls using the sample of households which had
no sick members. The results, reported in Table A.3, verify that the instrument does not predict
fluctuations in labor hours for all categories of labor included in our analysis; in each case, the
13

For example, we include existence of a daily market, motorable road, public transport, and secondary school; for
a full listing of the variables included, please refer to the note at the bottom of Table II.
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coefficient is quite small and insignificantly different from zero. This falsification provides further evidence that the instrument affects labor outcomes purely through its effect on healthcare
choice, and therefore, evidence of the validity of the instrument’s exclusion from second stage
regressions.
4.2.4

Nonlinear effects of endogenous distance

Finally, we allow for the possibility that distance enters the first and second stages nonlinearly.
We do this to further preclude the possibility that the interaction instrument is only capturing
a nonlinear effect of distance (or extreme remoteness), rather than the interaction of distance
with a randomized, transitory source of variation. To account for this concern, we include quintiles of the distribution of distance to the nearest health facility, hospital and dispensary in all
regressions.

5
5.1

Results
First Stage Results

Results from the first stage regressions are presented in Table II. In the first stage specification in
column 1, we regress the proportion of sick individuals in the household who visited a healthcare facility (normalized by its standard deviation) on the proposed instrument of the interaction
of days of rainfall in month of survey and a dummy for the lack of a formal-sector healthcare
facility in the individual’s community. The results in column 1 of Table II show a significant
reduction in the proportion of sick individuals choosing formal-sector care when the interaction
instrument increases. The F-stat on the instrument coefficient is nearly 16 (p = 0.000135).
As a robustness check to a different set of controls, we run the same specification as reported
in column 1 excluding, first, all demographic controls and then interactions of days of rainfall
and resource existence dummies as well (see section 3 for details). The results, reported in
columns 2 and 3 of Table II, respectively, are qualitatively similar to the original specification,
though the coefficient on the instrument and the F-stat are reduced in column 3.
In column 4 of Table II, we report the results of a specification with the full set of controls but
excluding the interaction instrument. Here, as expected, we see a strongly negative correlation
between choosing formal-sector care and the non-existence of a health facility in the household’s
village. The coefficient on days of rainfall in the month of survey is small and insignificant.
This result is also in line with our expectations, as the composite effect of rainfall on healthcare
choice is conceptually ambiguous: as discussed in section 4, rainfall affects not only the cost of
travel to a facility but also many other economic and health-related outcomes for households in
agricultural societies.
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5.2

Health Outcomes

Column 1 of Table III presents results from the second stage IV regression of the proportion of
household sick who were still ill at the time of survey on the normalized proportion of household sick who visited formal-sector care. The results show a large and significant reduction in
the proportion of individuals still ill when these individuals are driven exogenously to formalsector care.
The magnitude of these results corresponds to the results in Adhvaryu and Nyshadham
(2010b), which applies a similar analysis at an individual level to the same data, and in Adhvaryu and Nyshadham (2010a), which applies a similar analysis to nationally representative
data on children under five in Tanzania. Note that the marked attenuation in the OLS estimates
reported in column 2 of Table III is also consistent with estimates from previous studies and
corresponds to bias due to self-selection into formal-sector care on the basis of severity.

5.3

Intra-Household Labor Responses

Now that we have verified the power of the interaction instrument to predict the use of formalsector care and the effects of formal-sector care on health outcomes, we next investigate the
effects of formal healthcare on the labor supply of sick and non-sick members of the household. We noted in the summary statistics that both household sick and non-sick members (in
households with at least one of each) seem to have the same allocations of labor across farm and
non-farm activities. In order to identify the causal effect of formal-sector acute care on the labor
supply of household members, we run the same IV specification reported in column 1 of Table
III with per capita labor supplies as outcomes. In Table IV, we present results on total labor supply and on allocations of total labor to farm and non-farm activities for sick individuals. Each
outcome is calculated by summing across sick members of the household and dividing by the
number of sick members.
The results in Table IV show that when sick household members are exogenously driven
to formal-sector care, they reallocate their time away from non-farm labor and back towards
farm labor. When the proportion of sick household members who visited formal-sector care
is increased by a standard deviation, non-farm labor of each of the sick household members is
decreased by more than 10 hours on average and farm labor is increased by nearly 9 hours on
average during the week prior to survey. Both effects are significant at the 5 percent level.
In Table V, we report the same regressions conducted on household non-sick labor supplies.
The results show the same pattern among non-sick members of the household as was reported
in Table IV among sick household members. That is, when sick members of the household are
driven exogenously to formal-sector care, the non-sick members of the household also draw
down their non-farm labor and increase their farm labor. The estimates show that when the
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proportion of sick members who visited formal-sector care is increased by one standard deviation, each non-sick member of the household decreases their non-farm labor by an average of
more than 9 hours and increases their farm labor by roughly 4 hours on average. The effect on
the non-farm labor of non-sick members is significant at the 5 percent level, while the effect on
farm labor is not significant at conventional levels.
Table VI shows results from the same regressions for labor supplies of all members of the
households. The dependent variables in the regressions reported in Table VI are calculated by
summing across all productive members of the household, both sick and non-sick, and dividing
by the number of productive members. The pattern of results is as expected given the results on
the subsamples of sick and non-sick household members: non-farm labor decreases and farm
labor increases as a result of an increase in the proportion of sick household members visiting
formal health facilities.
Exploring further these effects on farm and non-farm labor, in Tables VII-IX, we break down
the effects of formal sector care on labor supplies into effects on subsets of farm and non-farm
activities. We show employment hours, hours spent in the field and herding, hours spent processing farm and animal products as subsets of farm labor; and self-employment and home
chores as subsets of non-farm labor.
In Table VII, we see that the positive effects of formal sector care on the farm labor hours
of sick household members are concentrated in hours spent in the field and herding livestock.
These results correspond to the idea that the productivity of sick household members is most affected in activities which require much physical effort, and that participation in these high effort
activities is restored when sick members receive high quality care. We also find that negative
effects on non-farm labor hours of sick household members are concentrated in hours spent in
self-employment. That is, it would appear that when household members fall acutely ill and are
made consequently less productive on the farm, they substitute away from farm activities and
towards self-enterprise activities which are more able to be completed at home.
In Table VIII, we find similar patterns of results on subsets of farm and non-farm labor hours
amongst non-sick members of the household. In particular, effects on non-farm labor hours are
concentrated on self-employment hours. Effects on farm labor hours are split between employment hours and hours spent in the field and herding livestock. The largest effects seem to be on
employment hours (which are in large part made up of working on neighbors’ farms, fishing,
and wage labor for educational and health institutions); however, these results lack precision
and should be interrupted with caution. Table IX shows results from the same regressions on
the whole household. The pattern of results is as expected given the results on sick and non-sick
subsamples reported in Tables VII and VIII.

18

5.4

Labor Complementarities

In section 2, it was demonstrated how estimates of the labor adjustments of sick and non-sick
household members could be used to test for the presence of complementarities in farm and
non-farm labor. Using the estimates described above, we return to equation 10, and examine
the case in which

∂l1f ∂l2f
,
∂pQ ∂pQ

< 0 (decrease in farm labor) and

∂t1 ∂t2
,
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Plugging these signs into equation 10, we obtain the following inequality:
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∂2n
∂t2 ∂t1

and

∂2f
∂l2 ∂l1

cannot

both be negative; that is, production in at least one sector must exhibit complementarities in
household labor.
Thus our results suggest that at least one, and perhaps all, of the productive activities in
which members of the agricultural households in our sample engage must exhibit complementarities among the labor inputs of various members of the household. This is potentially an
important result, given the frequency with which previous studies of the agricultural household have assumed that family labor inputs are at least imperfectly substitutable. The pattern
of empirical results in this study suggests that the substitutability of family labor inputs in the
agricultural household model is not necessarily an appropriate assumption in all settings.

5.5

Farm-specific Complementarities

As discussed, our test is a composite one for complementarities in at least one sector of production. Therefore, we have so far provided empirical evidence of the existence of labor complementarities in farm and/or home production. However, though we might hypothesize that certain farm activities likely exhibit labor complementarities, we must provide additional evidence
to support such a hypothesis.
In Tables X-XII, we report results from second stage regressions of the proportion of household members participating in certain farm activities on healthcare choice of sick household
members. The specifications are identical to those reported in previous tables, however the out19

comes are proportions of sick, non-sick, and all household members participating in activities
as opposed to per capita hours spent in these activities because data on hours spent in specific
farm-related activities was not collected.
In Table X, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of sick household
members visiting formal-sector care induces nearly a 20 percentage point decrease in the percentage of sick household members who participated in crop maintenance (weeding, pruning,
fertilizing, etc.). Correspondingly, a one standard deviation increase in formal-sector care use
induces roughly a 21 percentage point increase in the percentage of sick household members
participating in the harvesting and bringing to market of crops.
These results, once again, correspond to a larger reduction in the productivity of sick household members in high effort activities (such as harvesting and carrying crops to market), as
compared to lower effort activities (such as weeding and pruning), as a result of an acute health
shock. Consequently, we find evidence of a substitution away from harvesting and toward crop
maintenance when ill, and back toward harvesting when recovered.
Of particular interest is the parallel pattern of results for farm activity of non-sick household
members reported in Table XI. We find effects on farm activity of non-sick household members in the same direction and of similar magnitude as those on farm activity of sick members.
That is, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of sick household members visiting
formal-sector care induces nearly a 19 percentage point reduction in the percentage of non-sick
household members participating in crop maintenance and a more than 18 percentage point
increase in the percentage of non-sick household members participating in harvesting and marketing activities. Table XII shows a nearly identical pattern amongst the household as a whole, as
expected. This is fairly strong evidence of the existence of labor complementarities specifically
in farm production. That is, we have evidence that at least one of these farm-related activities
exhibits labor complementarities.

6
6.1

Alternative Explanations
Externality to Non-Farm Labor

Previous literature has emphasized hours spent caring for ill household members as a component of intra-household labor reallocations in response to health shocks (Pitt and Rosenzweig
1990). It is possible that an added return to time spent off the farm by non-sick household
members (that is, an ability to simultaneously care for sick household members while engaging in non-farm labor), might masquerade as an observed complementarity between sick and
non-sick labor without the existence of true complementarities in either production technology.
However, it should be noted that the additional evidence presented above in favor of labor
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complementarities specifically in farm-related activities mitigates this concern.
Nevertheless, we are able to test directly for effects of formal healthcare on care hours of
non-sick household members in order to evaluate the validity in our empirical context of this
alternative explanation. If an externality to home labor in the presence of health shocks is in fact
a primary explanation for the pattern of empirical results discussed above, we should expect
to find that an increase in the proportion of sick household members who visited formal-sector
care reduces the number of hours spent by non-sick members of the household caring for sick
household members.
The results from this regression are reported in column 1 of Table XIII. We find a small and
weakly significant positive effect of an increase in the proportion of household sick who visited a
health facility on care hours of non-sick household members. A one standard deviation increase
in the proportion of sick household members visiting formal health facilities generates only a
1 hour increase in care hours per non-sick. This likely cannot explain the shift from non-farm
to farm labor among non-sick members, given that care hours are likely not spent on the farm.
Furthermore, compared to the roughly 10 hour reallocation from non-farm to farm labor among
non-sick household members shown in Table V, this 1 hour increase in care hours is quite small.
Columns 3 and 5 report results from these same regressions conducted on male and female
subsamples of non-sick household members, respectively. If time spent caring for sick household members is in fact a primary explanation for the labor reallocation pattern observed in
the data, we would expect that female care hours might respond more to formal care. We find
no significant effects on care hours, even among females who are thought to be more likely to
provide care to sick members of the household.
Lastly, we would expect that the care hours explanation would likely be most appropriate
when children make up most of the sick members of the household. Columns 2, 4, and 6 of
Table XIII report results from regressions of the care hours of all non-sick, male non-sick, and
female non-sick members, respectively, on both the proportion of sick members visiting formal
care facilities and its interaction with the proportion of sick members in the household that are
children. We instrument for the interaction with the interaction of our usual instrument and the
proportion of sick members who are children. Again, we find that, even when all the sick members of the household are children, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of sick
members visiting formal health facilities generates a small and weakly significant positive effect
on the care hours of all non-sick members, and smaller insignificant effects on the subsamples
of non-sick male and females.

6.2

Health Spillovers

Another candidate explanation which might give the appearance of complementarities is the
presence health spillovers between acutely ill members and reportedly non-sick members of
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the household. Several types of spillovers must be considered. First, household members may
value each other’s health; second, health shocks to one household member may affect another
member’s health directly through disease contagion; third, individuals seeking treatment for
acute health shocks may enable easier access to medicines or information for other (non-acutely
ill) members of the household (treatment spillovers). We address these in succession below.
6.2.1

Utility spillovers

As relates to the first concern, our model explicitly allows for utility spillovers of health. Each
individual’s utility function is allowed to depend (non-separably) on both own health and the
health of the other household member. As shown in section 2, our test of complementarities
goes through when allowing for utility spillovers of health.
6.2.2

Contagion

The second possibility–that health shocks spill over across household members due to contagion–
is one that until now we have explicitly disallowed from the model. To understand what problems contagion-based health spillovers would generate for our test of complementarities, suppose that each household member’s health were a function of own health shock and the health
shocks of the other household member. Thus for i ∈ {1, 2} we now have
(16)

hi = h(σi Qi , σ−i Q−i , εi , ε−i ).
Clearly, in this case,

∂h−i
∂pQ

is in general non-zero, even when σ−i = 0; that is, non-sick indi-

viduals’ health stocks are directly affected by health shocks to other members in the household.
Indeed, we may expect that

∂h−i
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< 0, since, in the case when contagion matters, increases in

the price of acute healthcare will worsen the effects of health shocks for both sick and healthy
individuals. Equation 10, from which we derive our test of complementarities, now becomes
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From the equation above, we can see that the validity of our test for complementarities in
household labor depends on the signs of the additional terms on either side of equation 17.
Maintaining the signs of the estimated labor adjustment terms (as well as the assumptions on
the concavity of production with respect to labor), it is easy to see that inequality ?? still holds if
∂2f
∂l2f ∂h2

>

∂2n
.
∂t2 ∂h2

22

(18)

That is, even in the presence of contagion effects, our test for complementarities will be
valid if complementarities between health and labor are greater for farm vis-a-vis non-farm
production.14 This statement would be consistent with the fact that farm labor requires more
physicality (e.g. more physical effort, more calories expended) than non-farm labor. However,
if the above inequality does not hold, we cannot in general determine the validity of the test;
validity will depend in this case on the relative magnitudes of the various terms above.
We cannot determine empirically whether the inequality above actually holds. However,
it does seem implausible in our context that health spillovers through contagion can entirely
explain the pattern of adjustments we observe. Since we divide the household into individuals
who reported being acutely sick and those who did not, the contagion effect would need to be
small enough that though non-sick individuals (as we classify them) are affected, they are not
affected enough to report being sick, but large enough that it drives changes in the labor allocations
of the non-sick that are commensurate, both in absolute magnitude and as a percentage of total
hours, with the changes observed for sick household members. We find (subjectively of course)
the likelihood to be small that the contagion effect achieves this balance perfectly.
6.2.3

Treatment spillovers

The third concern regarding to spillover effects relates to the idea that treatment sought by
acutely ill members of the household has spillover effects on the health of non-sick members.
One might imagine that household members who are chronically ill, but not acutely so, accompany acutely ill members to treatment, or that acutely ill individuals bring back medication
or treatment-related information to other members of the household. These examples can be
explained by the same extension to the model as shown above.
In this case, we would expect to see that increases in the proportion of sick members of
the household visiting formal care generates improvements in the health status of reportedly
non-acutely-ill members of the household (either through reduced contagion brought about by
improved health outcomes of sick members or through healthcare spillovers from sick members
visiting formal care). In columns 1-3 of Table XIV, we report results from second stage IV regressions of the proportion of non-sick members who reported chronic illness on the proportion of
sick members who visited formal healthcare in our usual specification. We find no significant
effects of the formal healthcare of sick members on chronic fever, weight loss, and rash among
non-sick members.
In columns 4-6 of Table XIV, we check the reduced form of the same regressions we reported in columns 1-3, in case the instrument affects non-sick health outcomes directly by other
channels than the formal care of sick household members. Again, we find no significant ef14

Of course, the reverse statement holds if health and labor are substitutes in the production processes.
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fects. Lastly, in columns 7-9, we check that the instrument has no effect on the chronic illness
of members of households with no sick members. A significant coefficient would suggest that
the exclusion restriction might be violated. We find precisely estimated zeros across all chronic
illnesses.

7

Conclusion

Previous studies of intra-household decision-making in the agricultural household have generally resorted to assumptions on the complementarity or substitutability of family labor. We
develop a model of health and intra-household allocations in which both sick and non-sick
members allocate their time across farm labor, non-farm labor, and leisure. Our simple test of
complementarities relies on the observation that acute sickness, and corresponding treatment
choices, generate variation in the productivities of both sick and non-sick individuals in the
household. The model predicts that sick and non-sick household members will adjust their labor allocations in parallel fashion only if their labor is complementary in at least one sector of
production.
We then use plausibly exogenous variation in the cost of formal-sector health care to show
that, in fact, an increase in the proportion of sick members visiting formal health facilities generates a decrease in non-farm labor and an increase in farm labor among both sick and non-sick
members. These results provide strong evidence that within family labor is complementary in
farm and/or non-farm production. Note, however, that this is an indirect test for labor complementarities. That is, the predictions from the model require only that at least one of the
production technologies exhibit complementarities in labor for sick and non-sick labor supplies
to adjust in parallel fashion across farm and non-farm activities.
We then provide additional evidence of parallel shifts among sick and non-sick household
members away from lower effort farm activities back towards higher effort farm activities when
sick household members are made well through formal-sector care. These results suggest that
at least some of these farm-specific activities exhibit labor complementarities. We further show
evidence that neither an externality to non-farm labor in the form of caring for sick household
members nor health spillovers can explain the observed pattern in labor responses to formal
healthcare in our context.
Our findings on the complementarity of labor in production activities of the agricultural
household are not specific to the effects of health shocks on labor allocations, but rather can
hopefully inform the modeling of time and resource allocations within the agricultural household more generally. Our results suggest that we must take care when modeling shocks and/or
policy interventions which affect the relative marginal productivities of labor or the opportunity
cost of time for members of agricultural households, to account for the various production ac24

tivities across which each member allocates his time and the ways in which family labor inputs
interact in these production technologies.
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A

Model Appendix

A.1

When Agricultural Wage Labor Constraints Do Not Bind

In the unconstrained case of the model, in which agricultural wage labor constraints do not
bind, we arrive at the same two first order conditions as in equations 6 and 7. We combine these
with the first order condition with respect to lh , hired labor on the farm, which is as follows
(using the same notation as in section 2):
−λ(−w) − δ = 0.

(19)

Combining, we get
pf

∂f
∂l2f

= w = pn

∂n
.
∂t2

(20)

∂n
We begin with the second equality in equation 20: w = pn ∂t
. Differentiating with respect to
2

pQ , we get:
∂ 2 n ∂t1
∂ 2 n ∂t2
∂ 2 n ∂h1
∂ 2 n ∂h2
+
+
+
= 0.
∂t2 ∂t1 ∂pQ
∂t22 ∂pQ ∂t2 ∂h1 ∂pQ ∂t2 ∂h2 ∂pQ

(21)

Note that farm production does not play a role in the equation above, meaning that the
implications we derive from above will solely be related to non-farm labor. As before,
and

∂h2
∂pQ

∂2n
∂t2 ∂h1

= 0,

= 0 when σ2 = 0, and thus
∂ 2 n ∂t1
∂ 2 n ∂t2
+
=0
∂t2 ∂t1 ∂pQ
∂t22 ∂pQ

(22)

Plugging in the estimated signs of the labor adjustments and making use of the concavity
ˆ1 > 0, ∂tˆ1 > 0, ∂ 2 n < 0), we find that ∂ 2 n > 0, i.e. that household
∂t
assumption as before ( ∂p
Q
∂t2 ∂t1
∂pQ
∂t2
2

labor in non-farm production must exhibit complementarities.
Using the first equality in equation 20 (pf

∂f
∂l2f

= w), and plugging in the estimated signs of

the farm labor adjustments as well as the concavity assumption on farm labor in production, we
get a similar implication for farm labor:

∂2f
∂l2f ∂l1f

> 0, i.e. that household labor in farm production

must exhibit complementarities as well. Thus a stronger conclusion than the one in the constrained case holds when agricultural wage labor is not constrained: here, labor in both sectors
must exhibit complementarities.
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A.2

Land as an Input Into Farm Production

Here we consider the case in which farm production takes land as an input. Let the farm production function be f (l1f , l2f , lh , h1 , h2 ; A), where A is the total plot area. Differentiating equation
8 with respect to pQ as before, we obtain the same equality as in equation 9, but with an added
term on the right-hand side, corresponding to the addition of A to the production function.
Equation 9 therefore becomes

=

When

∂A
∂pQ

p

n

p

f



∂ 2 n ∂t1
∂ 2 n ∂t2
∂ 2 n ∂h1
∂ 2 n ∂h2
+
+
+
∂t2 ∂t1 ∂pQ
∂t22 ∂pQ ∂t2 ∂h1 ∂pQ ∂t2 ∂h2 ∂pQ



∂ 2 f ∂l2f
∂ 2 f ∂h1
∂ 2 f ∂h2
∂ 2 f ∂A
∂l1f
+
+ f
+ f
+ f
2
Q
Q
Q
f f ∂pQ
∂l2 ∂l1
∂l2 ∂h1 ∂p
∂l2 ∂h2 ∂p
∂l2 ∂A ∂pQ
∂l2f ∂p
∂2f

!
.

(23)

is 0, the above equation is the same as equation 9. In fact, we find that in our

context land is most often inherited and less frequently bought and sold on spot markets. That
is, a household would likely find it very difficult to make short-term changes to their stock of
land, and we do not see such high-frequency variation in the data. Specifically, amongst our
main sample of household with at least one sick member and one non-sick member, roughly
48 percent of land owned by the household was inherited, while only 23 percent was bought
at some point. Most importantly, only .4 percent of land currently owned was bought in the 6
months prior to survey.

B
B.1

Additional Results
Sample Selection

In Table A.1, we report results from sample selection regressions of dummies for inclusion in
the various samples used in the analysis on the interaction instrument, the main effects of the
facility non-existence dummy and days of rainfall in the month of survey, and the full set of
controls used in the preferred first and second stage regressions. Column 1 reports results from
the specification checking for selection into the sample of households with one sick and one
non-sick member above the age of 7 on the basis of the instrument. Columns 2 and 3 report
results from checks for selection into the samples of households with one sick member and one
non-sick member who is male and female, respectively. Column 4 reports results from the check
for selection into the sample of households with no sick members. Across all checks, we find no
evidence that the instrument predicts selection into the sample.
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B.2

Collinearity Between Instrument and Resource Access Controls

To the degree that general remoteness strongly predicts both the presence of all resources in
the community, including health facilities, we might be worried about collinearity between the
health facility non-existence dummy and the dummies for the presence of other resources in
the community such as daily market, motorable road, post office or telephone, etc. Table A.2
reports results from the regression of the No Facility dummy on the resource dummies included
in set of controls of the preferred specifications from the analysis. The results show significant
correlations, but sufficient residual variation in the No Facility dummy. The R-squared is only
.324, indicating that nearly two-thirds of the variation in the No Facility dummy is orthogonal
to the various resource access controls. Therefore, collinearity is not an issue.

B.3

Falsification on Non-Sick Households

A crucial assumption for the validity of the empirical strategy used in the analysis is the excludability of the interaction instrument from second stage regressions. In order for this assumption
to hold, we must believe that the instrument affects second stage outcomes only through its
effects on formal healthcare use.
As a falsification exercise to check the appropriateness of this assumption, we run our usual
labor supply regressions in reduced form on households with no sick members. If in fact the
instrument has no effect on labor supply except through its effects on the formal care use of
sick members of the households, we should expect to find no effects of the instrument on labor
outcomes of members of households with no sick members. In Table A.3, results from these
reduced form regressions confirm that the instrument does not predict total labor supply nor
labor allocations across productive activities of members of entirely non-sick households.

B.4
B.4.1

Heterogeneity
Sick and Non-Sick Labor Responses By Gender and Age

In Tables A.4 and A.5, we investigate heterogeneity in the sick and non-sick labor responses
to formal care use across gender and age. In Table A.4, we regress the usual per capita labor
supply variables for sick and non-sick members on both the proportion of sick members visiting
formal care and its interaction with the proportion of sick members who are male in the usual
specification. We again instrument for the interaction with the product of our usual interaction
instrument and the proportion of sick members who are male.
The results in the top panel of Table A.4 show that when all the sick members in the household are male, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of sick members visiting
formal care generates the same 9 hours increase in farm labor seen among all non-sick members
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in Table V but a significantly larger 15 hour decrease in non-farm labor. This larger decrease in
non-farm labor among sick males (as compared to females) is made up entirely of home chores,
and generates a statistically significant 7 hour decrease in total labor hours. In contrast, when
all the sick members of the household are female, while a one standard deviation increase in
the proportion visiting formal care still generates a 9 hour increase in farm labor it causes a
large (more than 9 hour) decrease in self-employment hours and a small, insignificant increase
of 4 hours in home chores. The result is an insignificant reduction of 5 hours in non-farm labor
among sick females.
In the bottom panel of Table A.4, we report the results for the same regressions as in the
top panel, but with non-sick labor hours as outcomes. The results show that when all the sick
members of the household are male, non-sick members of the household reallocate their labor
much less than in response to sick females. A one standard deviation increase in the proportion
of sick visiting formal healthcare, when all sick members are male, generates a small 1 hour
decrease in total non-sick labor hours, a small insignificant 3 hour increase in farm labor, and a
4 hour decrease in non-farm labor. This small decrease in non-farm labor in response to the use
of formal-healthcare amongst sick males is made up of a 6 hour decrease in self-employment
and a 2 hour increase in home chores. Again, we find a contrasting response in non-sick labor
hours to formal care among sick females. Total labor hours of non-sick members decrease by an
average of 9 hours when the proportion visiting healthcare increases by one standard deviation
and all sick members are female. Farm hours increase insignificantly by 4 hours, and non-farm
hours decrease by 14 hours. The decrease in non-farm hours is significant at the 1 percent level
and is made up of a 6 hour decrease in self-employment and an 8 hour decrease in home chores.
In summary, it seems that the labor hours of sick males respond more to formal healthcare
than that of sick females, with comparable increases in farm labor but larger decreases in home
chores. On the other hand, non-sick labor supply responds more to formal healthcare use among
sick females, with larger decreases in home chores as well.
Table A.5 reports results from regressions exploring heterogeneity across age. The specifications are identical to those reported in Table A.4, but we interact the proportion visiting formal
care with the proportion of sick members who are children instead of the proportion of sick who
are male. The results in the top panel show that when all sick household members are children
a one standard deviation increase in the proportion visiting formal care causes only a 3 hour
increase in farm labor of sick members and a decrease of more than 8 hours in non-farm labor,
made up largely of a decrease in self-employment. On the other hand, when all sick household
members are adults, an increase in the proportion visiting formal care brings about a 10 hour
increase in farm labor and a 9 hour decrease in non-farm labor (mostly, self-employment).
Effects on household non-sick labor, reported in the bottom panel of Table A.5, seem to be
less heterogeneous across the age of household members who fall ill. That is, non-sick non32

farm labor decreases significantly by nearly 10 hours (mostly, in self-employment) with a one
standard deviation increase in the proportion of sick members visiting formal care irrespective
of whether the sick members of the household are adults or children, and farm labor increases
insignificantly.
Overall, it seems sick children do not adjust their farm hours much following formal healthcare but significantly reduce their non-farm labor, particularly their hours spent in self-employment;
while adults also significantly reduce their self-employment hours, but significantly increase
their farm labor in exchange. Non-sick labor supply in the household responds the same to
sickness and healthcare among children and adults: self-employment hours decrease significantly, farm labor increases insignificantly.
B.4.2

Degree of Complementarity Across Gender and Age

In Tables A.6 and A.7, we explore the degree of complementarity across gender and age. To
do so, we run regressions identical to those reported in Tables A.4 and A.5, but with genderspecific per capita labor hours as outcomes. In the top panel of Table A.6, the results suggest
that male non-sick labor hours respond more to the proportion of household sick visiting formal
care when all sick members are female than when all sick members are male. That is, non-sick
male non-farm labor decreases significantly by nearly 12 hours and farm hours increase weakly
by 5 hours when all sick members are female, but non-farm labor decreases weakly by only 6
hours and farm labor is virtually unaffected when all sick members are male (differences are
significant for farm labor and home chores at the 10 percent level). In the bottom panel of Table
A.6, results suggest that female non-sick labor hours also respond more to formal healthcare
use by sick household members when those members are female as compared to when sick
household members are all male.
The results reported in the top panel of Table A.7 show little evidence of heterogeneity across
the age of sick household members in labor supply responses by non-sick children. Non-sick
child non-farm labor decreases by roughly 9 hours (self-employment decreases by 2 hours and
home time decreases by nearly 7 hours) with a one standard deviation increase in proportion
of household sick visiting a formal health facility, regardless of the proportion of sick who are
children, and farm labor appears unaffected. Similarly, in the bottom panel we find no significant differences in non-sick adult labor supply responses across age of household sick; however,
the point estimates suggest that farm labor increases and non-farm labor reductions in non-sick
adult labor might be slightly larger when all sick household members are children.
Overall, the results suggest that female labor is complementary to other female labor and to
male labor, but that male labor is less complementary to other male labor. Also, it seems that
child labor is complementary to other child labor, and perhaps that adult and child labor are
slightly stronger complements.
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C

Construction of variables

The following list describes the construction of variables used in analysis:
• sick = 1 if the household reported having at least one member who was sick with an
illness that began 14 days or less prior to the date of survey, sick = 0 otherwise.
• h = 1 if sick individual visited hospital, health center or dispensary (government, NGO
or private); h = 0 otherwise; then these binaries are averaged to create a proportion of the
sick members of the household who visited a formal-sector care facility
• raindays equals the number of days of rainfall at the rainfall station closest to the household’s sample cluster, in the month and year that the household was surveyed
• histmean of rainfall is the number of days of rainfall in the month of survey averaged over
all years in which rainfall data are recorded for that cluster in the particular month
• histsd is calculated as the standard deviation of the historical distribution of days of rainfall in the month of survey, across all years in which rainfall data are recorded for that
cluster in the particular month
• histmeansq and histsdsq are smooth polynomials to the second degree in historical mean
days of rainfall and historical standard deviation of days of rainfall, respectively
• raindayslast equals the number of days of rainfall at the rainfall station closest to the
household’s sample cluster, in the month before that in which the household was surveyed
of the same year
• decraindays and decrainf all are categorical variables reporting which decile of the rain
days and rainfall distributions, respectively, the rain in the survey month falls; fixed effects
for each decile are included in all specifications
• noexist is a binary variable which takes value noexist = 1 if neither hospital, health center,
nor dispensary of (government, NGO or private) exists in the community, and noexist = 0
otherwise (Note: for waves in which these data were missing, the values were filled first
using the minimum from the waves in which the data were not missing for that cluster,
and second using the minimum of non-missing values from clusters matched to the same
rain station in the same wave; that is, if a facility of these types ever existed in that cluster
or in very proximate clusters before or after the year in which the data are missing, we
assumed it existed during this wave as well)
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• For the following facilities/attributes (x), we calculate distances as dist(x) = 0 if the facility/attribute exists in the same village as the household; dist(x) equals the distance to
the nearest such facility/attribute outside the household’s village if one does not exist in
the village (Note: for waves in which these data were missing, the values were filled first
using the mean from the waves in which the data were not missing, and second using
non-missing data from clusters matched to the same rain station in the same wave)
– Hospital
– Health center
– Dispensary
– Daily market
– Periodic market
– Motorable road
– Public transportation
– Secondary school
– Bank
– Post office/telephone booth
• Categorical variables for the quintiles of the distributions of the above defined distances
to hospital, health center, and dispensary were created and included in all specifications
• dist, distsq, and distcub are smooth polynomials up to the third degree in the minimum
distance to either a hospital, health center, or dispensary
• hhsize, hhsizesq, and hhsizecub are smooth polynomials up to the third degree in the
number of members of the household
• age1, age2, and age3 are smooth polynomials up to the third degree in the mean age of the
respondents in the household
• assets is a categorical variable measuring the value of all assets of the household; fixed
effects for these categorical values are included in all specifications
• adult, kid, male, f emale, man, woman, boy, and girl reflect the number of members of
the household of each gender, age, and gender/age combination; where adult is defined
age > 15 and kid = adult
• hhadultsick, hhkidsick, hhmalesick, hhf emalesick, hhmansick, hhwomansick, hhboysick,
and hhgirlsick reflect the number of members of the household of each gender, age, and
35

gender/age combination who qualified as sick == 1, by the above definition, at the time
of survey
• hhadultnosick, hhkidnosick, hhmalenosick, hhf emalenosick, hhmannosick, hhwomannosick,
hhboynosick, and hhgirlnosick reflect the number of members of the household of each
gender, age, and gender/age combination who qualified as sick == 0, by the above definition, at the time of survey
• hhsick, hhsicksq, and hhsickcub are smooth polynomials up to the third degree in the
number of members of the household who qualified as sick == 1
• educ is the maximum value within the household of a categorical variable for how much
education the respondents have completed; fixed effects for each of these values are included in all specifications
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Table I: Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics of Variables of Interest in Sick and Non-Sick Samples
Household-Year Observations:
2146
1049

with at least one sick and one non-sick member
with no sick members
Proportion of Sick Household Members Still Ill

0.416

0.430

Proportion of Sick Household Members Visited Formal Healthcare (normalized)

0.615

0.999

Non-Sick
Members

Sick Members

(households with at least one sick and one
non-sick member)

Time use per member of household (hours in week before survey)
Total Labor
Farm
Employment
Field and Herd
Processing
Non-farm
Self-employment
Home
Care

No Sick
Members
(households with no
sick members)

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

29.567
13.597
2.481
10.925
0.191
15.970
3.114
12.857
0.803

20.922
12.663
8.259
10.222
1.113
16.033
12.385
10.535
3.291

29.037
13.465
2.637
10.670
0.159
15.572
3.376
12.196
0.866

18.361
10.956
7.538
9.165
0.797
14.780
12.376
8.751
2.903

34.246
15.991
4.073
11.727
0.191
18.255
3.504
14.751
0.855

18.611
12.014
10.004
8.787
0.960
14.203
11.863
8.279
3.958

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Costs of Healthcare
# of days of rain in month of survey

7.998

5.298

8.249

5.125

No health facility in community

0.627

0.484

0.651

0.477

Resources in Community
Daily market
Periodic market
Motorable road
Public transport
Secondary school
Bank
Post office/telephone booth

0.605
0.339
0.956
0.275
0.119
0.112
0.130

0.489
0.474
0.205
0.447
0.324
0.315
0.337

0.564
0.369
0.972
0.326
0.117
0.112
0.143

0.496
0.483
0.164
0.469
0.322
0.315
0.350

Demographic Characteristics
Age
Household size
No. of Female Members
Household assets (Deciles)

28.022
5.134
2.702
5.141

9.202
2.334
1.623
2.833

33.442
3.561
1.867
4.427

14.858
1.996
1.304
2.833

Notes: Sample used in analysis is made up of households with at least one member with illness that began in the two weeks prior to survey.

Table II: First Stage and Robustness Checks
Interaction of Rain and Distance to Health Facility on Proportion Visiting Formal Healthcare
First Stage

Main Effects

All Controls

Interactions of Resource
Dummies and Days of
Rainfall

No Controls

Days of Rainfall x No Facility

-0.0579***
(0.0147)

-0.0566***
(0.0139)

-0.0288***
(0.00965)

No Facility

-0.0872
(0.271)

-0.137
(0.281)

-0.0557
(0.280)

-0.507***
(0.0806)

Days of Rainfall

0.0960*
(0.0532)

0.0846
(0.0513)

0.0524
(0.0501)

0.00294
(0.0115)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1932
0.615

1995
0.615

1995
0.615

1932
0.615

F-test: Rain x Distance=0
Prob>F

15.56
0.000135

16.50
8.73e-05

8.903
0.00345

No Rain Interactions

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Standard errors are clustered at the sampling cluster by year level. All specifications inlcude main effects of
days of rainfall and "No Facility," assets, highest eduction in household, district, rain station, and year of survey group effects; as well as polynomials up to a third degree in average age
in household, third degree polynomials of no. of household sick and household size, and distance to nearest health facility if one does not exist in community. Specifications also include
decilies of days of rainfall and levels of rainfall as well as for how long ago the illness started; and quintiles for distance to nearest hospital, healthcare facility, and dispensary. Dummies
for the existence of a daily market, periodic market, motorable road, public transport, secondary school, bank and post office/telephone are included; along with interactions of these
dummies with days of rainfall. Other controls include historical means and standard deviations of both rainfall and quadratic terms of these; days of rainfall in month prior to survey
and its interaction with "No Facility;" and gender/age composition of the household. All samples in the analyses, unless otherwise stated, are restricted to households with at least one
member with an illness that began in the two weeks prior to survey and at least one member that did not report such an illness.

Table III: Health Outcomes
Effects of Healthcare Choice on Proportion of Household Still Ill
Second Stage IV

OLS

-0.200**

-0.0330***

(0.0992)

(0.0122)

Observations

1932

1932

Mean of Dependent Variable

0.416

0.416

Formal Healthcare

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table IV: Labor Supply of Houshold Sick
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Labor Per Capita of Household Sick
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Total Labor Hours

Farm Labor

Non-Farm Labor

Formal Healthcare

-1.726
(5.095)

8.675**
(4.240)

-10.40**
(4.215)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1932
29.57

1932
13.60

1932
15.97

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table V: Labor Supply of Houshold Non-Sick
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Labor Per Capita of Household Non-Sick
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Total Labor Hours

Farm Labor

Non-Farm Labor

Formal Healthcare

-5.286
(3.883)

4.082
(2.938)

-9.368**
(4.093)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1932
29.04

1932
13.47

1932
15.57

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table VI: Household Labor Supply
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Household Labor Supply Per Capita
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Total Labor Hours

Farm Labor

Non-Farm Labor

Formal Healthcare

-2.747
(3.261)

4.962*
(2.641)

-7.709**
(3.008)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1932
29.42

1932
13.53

1932
15.89

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table VII: Components of Labor Supply of Houshold Sick
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Labor Per Capita of Household Sick
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Farm Labor

Non-Farm Labor

Employment

Field and Herd

Processing

Self-Employment

Home

Formal Healthcare

2.802
(3.100)

5.712**
(2.745)

0.161
(0.231)

-8.211**
(3.616)

-2.190
(2.733)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1932
2.481

1932
10.92

1932
0.191

1932
3.114

1932
12.86

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table VIII: Components of Labor Supply of Houshold Non-Sick
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Labor Per Capita of Household Non-Sick
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Farm Labor

Non-Farm Labor

Employment

Field and Herd

Processing

Self-Employment

Home

Formal Healthcare

2.502
(1.666)

1.647
(2.727)

-0.0676
(0.176)

-6.479*
(3.642)

-2.889
(1.969)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1932
2.637

1932
10.67

1932
0.159

1932
3.376

1932
12.20

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table IX: Components of Household Labor Supply
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Household Labor Supply Per Capita
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Farm Labor

Non-Farm Labor

Employment

Field and Herd

Processing

Self-Employment

Home

Formal Healthcare

2.021
(1.276)

2.906
(2.470)

0.0352
(0.160)

-6.615**
(2.575)

-1.094
(1.318)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1932
2.577

1932
10.78

1932
0.170

1932
3.354

1932
12.54

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table X: Farm Activity of Household Sick
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Proportion of Household Sick in Farm Activities
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Crop Maintenance
(Weeding, Pruning, etc.)

Land Preperation &
Planting

Harvesting &
Marketing

Formal Healthcare

-0.216
(0.135)

0.183
(0.122)

0.224*
(0.135)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1932
0.535

1932
0.278

1932
0.169

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table XI: Farm Activity of Household Non-Sick
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Proportion of Household Non-Sick in Farm Activities
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Crop Maintenance
(Weeding, Pruning, etc.)

Land Preperation &
Planting

Harvesting &
Marketing

Formal Healthcare

-0.189*
(0.113)

0.0215
(0.0904)

0.184
(0.112)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1932
0.502

1932
0.256

1932
0.162

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table XII: Household Farm Activity
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Proportion of Household in Farm Activities
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Crop Maintenance
(Weeding, Pruning, etc.)

Land Preperation &
Planting

Harvesting &
Marketing

Formal Healthcare

-0.198*
(0.107)

0.123
(0.0953)

0.209*
(0.115)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1932
0.514

1932
0.265

1932
0.164

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table XIII: Care Hours of Household Non-Sick Males and Females
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Hours Per Capita Spent Caring for Ill
Total

Male

Female

(at least one sick and one non- (at least one sick member and (at least one sick member and
sick member)
Child x Formal Healthcare

Formal Healthcare

one non-sick male)

-0.0880
(0.791)
1.035*
(0.564)

1.100*
(0.611)

one non-sick female)

-0.304
(0.565)
0.772
(0.558)

0.887
(0.644)

0.716
(1.261)
0.528
(0.708)

0.394
(0.693)

Observations

1932

1932

1599

1599

1598

1598

Mean of Dependent Variable

0.866

0.866

0.568

0.568

1.144

1.144

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments. Samples are restricted as noted.

Table XIV: Health Spillovers
Effects of Healthcare Choice on Proportion of Non-Sick Members Reporting Chronic Illness
Second Stage IV

Chronic
Fever

Chronic
Weight Loss

Reduced Form
Chronic
Rash

Chronic
Fever

Reduced Form Falsification

Chronic
Chronic Rash
Weight Loss

(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Formal Healthcare

0.0522

-0.101

0.0464

(0.0346)

(0.0688)

(0.0493)

Days of Rainfall x No Facility

Chronic
Fever

Chronic
Chronic Rash
Weight Loss

(Households with no sick members)

-0.00302

0.00584

-0.00269

-0.00424

0.00265

-0.00518

(0.00195)

(0.00376)

(0.00263)

(0.00285)

(0.00388)

(0.00408)

Observations

1932

1932

1932

1932

1932

1932

906

906

906

Mean of Dependent Variable

0.208

0.107

0.0478

0.0435

0.116

0.0515

0.0435

0.116

0.0515

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table A.1: Selection Checks
Relationship Between Instrument and Selection into Various Samples
1 Sick, 1 Non-Sick
Productive Member

1 Sick, 1 Non-Sick
Productive Male

1 Sick, 1 Non-Sick
Productive Female

No Sick

Days of Rainfall x No Facility

-0.00238
(0.00491)

-0.00349
(0.00488)

-0.00174
(0.00497)

0.00341
(0.00504)

No Facility

0.169
(0.137)

0.0818
(0.117)

0.124
(0.134)

-0.111
(0.135)

Days of Rainfall

-0.0163
(0.0202)

-0.0352**
(0.0168)

-0.0283
(0.0192)

0.0168
(0.0227)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

2960
0.641

2960
0.529

2960
0.529

2960
0.311

F-test: Instrument = 0
Prob>F

0.236
0.628

0.511
0.476

0.123
0.726

0.458
0.500

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Dependent variables are binaries for whether the household is included in each sample. See
Table II for other notes.

Table A.2: Partial Correlations of Access Variables
Regression of No Health Facility in Community on Presence of Other Resources
No Facility
Daily Market

-0.126***
(0.0147)

Periodic Market

0.0753***
(0.0153)

Motorable Road

-0.196***
(0.0365)

Public Transportation

-0.0418**
(0.0188)

Secondary School

-0.179***
(0.0229)

Bank

-0.0534**
(0.0254)

Post or Public Telephone

-0.618***
(0.0241)

Observations

3383

R-Squared

0.324

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table A.3: Labor Supply of Households with No Sick Members
Reduced Form Effects of Intrument on Labor of Households with No Sick Members
Non-Farm Labor

Total Labor
Hours

Farm Labor

Days of Rainfall x No Facility

-0.0624
(0.394)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

Total

Self-Employment
Total

Home Total

-0.00712
(0.265)

-0.0552
(0.314)

-0.176
(0.298)

0.121
(0.124)

906

906

906

906

906

34.25

15.99

18.26

3.504

14.75

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments. Sample is restricted to households with no
b

ll

h

b

h

k

Table A.4: Heterogeneous Labor Supply Responses to Sickness Across Genders
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice Amongst Sick Males and Females on Labor Per Capita of Household
Non-Farm Labor
Total Labor Hours

Farm Labor

Total

Self-Employment
Total

Home Total

Effects on Labor Supply of Sick Household Members
Male x Formal Healthcare

-10.53**
(5.277)

-0.747
(3.784)

-9.785***
(3.751)

2.576
(2.687)

-12.36***
(2.814)

Formal Healthcare

3.488
(6.391)

8.834**
(4.225)

-5.346
(4.773)

-9.377**
(3.813)

4.031
(3.025)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1932
29.57

1932
13.60

1932
15.97

1932
3.114

1932
12.86

Effects on Labor Supply of Non-Sick Household Members
Male x Formal Healthcare

8.052**
(3.474)

-1.774
(2.375)

9.826***
(3.034)

-0.511
(2.120)

10.34***
(2.189)

Formal Healthcare

-9.186**
(3.955)

4.894
(3.174)

-14.08***
(4.431)

-6.081*
(3.659)

-7.999***
(2.114)

Observations

1932

1932

1932

1932

1932

Mean of Dependent Variable

29.04

13.47

15.57

3.376

12.20

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table A.5: Heterogeneous Labor Supply Responses to Sickness Across Age
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice Amongst Sick Children and Adults on Labor Per Capita of Household
Total Labor
Hours

Non-Farm Labor
Farm Labor

Total

Self-Employment
Total

Home Total

Effects on Labor Supply of Sick Household Members
Child x Formal Healthcare

-14.05**
(5.741)

-6.321**
(2.866)

-7.728
(5.248)

-6.310
(4.491)

-1.418
(2.614)

Formal Healthcare

0.951
(5.429)

9.680**
(4.439)

-8.730**
(4.252)

-6.783*
(3.483)

-1.947
(2.853)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1932
29.57

1932
13.60

1932
15.97

1932
3.114

1932
12.86

Effects on Labor Supply of Non-Sick Household Members
Child x Formal Healthcare

4.383
(4.141)

3.639
(3.010)

0.744
(3.314)

1.667
(2.876)

-0.923
(2.125)

Formal Healthcare

-6.172
(3.964)

3.252
(2.760)

-9.423**
(4.152)

-6.828*
(3.587)

-2.596
(1.977)

Observations

1932

1932

1932

1932

1932

Mean of Dependent Variable

29.04

13.47

15.57

3.376

12.20

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table A.6: Heterogeneous Labor Supply Responses of Non-Sick Males and Females
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice Amongst Sick Males and Females on Non-Sick Male and Female Labor
Non-Farm Labor
Total Labor Hours

Farm Labor

Total

Self-Employment
Total

Home Total

Effects on Labor Supply of Non-Sick Male Household Members
Male x Formal Healthcare

0.0164
(4.369)

-5.504*
(3.322)

5.520
(3.635)

1.988
(3.321)

3.533*
(1.944)

Formal Healthcare

-6.376
(5.617)

5.295
(3.926)

-11.67**
(5.506)

-7.806
(5.229)

-3.865**
(1.802)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1599
26.75

1599
15.02

1599
11.73

1599
4.631

1599
7.097

Effects on Labor Supply of Non-Sick Female Household Members
Male x Formal Healthcare

5.333
(4.203)

0.982
(2.513)

4.351
(2.681)

0.427
(1.527)

3.924*
(2.237)

Formal Healthcare

-5.117
(5.208)

2.806
(2.960)

-7.922*
(4.451)

-4.745
(3.360)

-3.177
(2.748)

Observations

1598

1598

1598

1598

1598

Mean of Dependent Variable

30.67

12.05

18.62

1.878

16.74

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

Table A.7: Heterogeneous Labor Supply Responses of Non-Sick Children and Adults
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice Amongst Sick Children and Adults on Non-Sick Child and Adult Labor
Total Labor
Hours

Non-Farm Labor
Farm Labor

Total

Self-Employment
Total

Home Total

Effects on Labor Supply of Non-Sick Child Household Members
Child x Formal Healthcare

-0.823
(4.563)

-1.510
(2.584)

0.687
(3.726)

-0.376
(0.939)

1.064
(3.223)

Formal Healthcare

-7.925
(5.892)

1.251
(3.462)

-9.176*
(4.963)

-2.209*
(1.335)

-6.967*
(4.171)

Observations
Mean of Dependent Variable

1244
17.67

1244
6.834

1244
10.83

1244
0.123

1244
10.71

Effects on Labor Supply of Non-Sick Adult Household Members
Child x Formal Healthcare

-1.895
(4.826)

1.719
(3.429)

-3.614
(4.392)

-2.181
(4.166)

-1.433
(2.329)

Formal Healthcare

-4.452
(4.485)

4.732*
(2.861)

-9.184**
(4.538)

-8.374*
(4.287)

-0.810
(1.910)

Observations

1818

1818

1818

1818

1818

Mean of Dependent Variable

34.10

16.61

17.49

4.791

12.70

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.

